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1Underdetermination and evidence in the developmental plasticity debate
Abstract: I identify a controversial hypothesis in evolutionary biology called the plasticity-first 
hypothesis. I argue that the plasticity-first hypothesis is underdetermined and that the most 
popular means of studying the plasticity-first hypothesis are insufficient to confirm or disconfirm
it. I offer a strategy for overcoming this problem. Researchers need to develop a richer middle 
range theory of plasticity-first evolution that allows them to identify distinctive empirical traces 
of the hypothesis. They can then use those traces to discriminate between rival explanations of 
evolutionary episodes. The best tools for developing such a middle range theory are experimental
evolution and formal modeling. 
 
2Underdetermination and evidence in the developmental plasticity debate1
1. Introduction. It is a striking fact of the biological world that phenotypic expression may be, 
and often is, influenced by an organism's developmental environment. This means that two 
genetically identical organisms raised in different environments can have different physical 
characteristics, use different strategies to avoid predators and find food, and even be of different 
sexes. Biologists increasingly recognize the importance of this phenomenon, which they call 
developmental plasticity (Pigliucci 2001), but hypotheses about its role in evolution are 
controversial. 
Perhaps the most controversial hypothesis is that many important phenotypic novelties 
owe their origins to developmental plasticity, because plasticity allows new phenotypes to 
emerge prior to genetic mutations or recombination (West-Eberhard 2003). This is the plasticity-
first hypothesis. Biologists have long debated both its plausibility and importance (e.g. Orr 1999;
Pigliucci 2007; Gilbert and Epel 2009; Jablonka and Raz 2009; Futuyma 2011; Dickins and 
Rahman 2012; and Moczek 2015), in part because it informs a broader controversy about the 
adequacy of central components of evolutionary theory (Laland et al. 2015, p. 2). Philosophers, 
too, are interested in whether the plasticity-first hypothesis poses a challenge to biological 
orthodoxy, but where they have examined its theoretical implications,2 I am interested in an 
epistemic question: what evidence do we need to settle the longstanding debate about the 
hypothesis?
I argue that the plasticity-first hypothesis is transiently underdetermined (Sklar 1975), 
that is, the presently available data does not confirm or disconfirm the plasticity-first hypothesis 
1 Acknowledgements removed for blind review.
2 Examples include an edited volume about the evolutionary significance of the Baldwin effect (Weber and Depew
2003), articles about the theoretical integration of evolution and development (Sterelny 2000; Amundson 2005; 
Love 2006), and Kaplan (2006) on non-genetic inheritance and developmental plasticity. 
3because it does not discriminate between the plasticity-first hypothesis and its theoretical rivals. 
Moreover, ancestral-descendent comparisons, which are the most popular means of studying the 
plasticity-first hypothesis, do not on their own generate the evidence needed to confirm or 
disconfirm the hypothesis. Together, these two facts explain why, even though the number of 
empirical studies about plasticity has grown substantially in the last decade (Forsman 2015), the 
debate about the plasticity-first hypothesis has reached a stalemate. 
I offer a strategy for overcoming this underdetermination problem. Researchers need to 
develop a richer middle range theory (Binford 1982; Jeffares 2008) of plasticity-first evolution, 
one that allows them to identify distinctive empirical traces of the hypothesis. Then they can 
search for those traces and use them to discriminate between rival explanations of evolutionary 
episodes. The best tools for developing that middle range theory are experimental evolution and 
formal modeling, not ancestral-descendant comparisons. 
My epistemic analysis also informs the theoretical side of the controversy over the 
plasticity-first hypothesis. There is a deflationary interpretation of the debate on which 
describing a particular evolutionary process as either an instance of plasticity-first or gene-first 
evolution is simply a matter of taste (Wagner 2011, p. 182). This deflationary view depends on 
the claim that there is no difference in the evolutionary patterns generated by plasticity-first and 
gene-first mechanisms, and thus the distinction between the two is explanatorily inert. The 
research strategy I suggest addresses this concern about explanatory inertia by prioritizing the 
discovery of empirical differences between the two kinds of mechanisms. Confirming the 
plasticity-first hypothesis and demonstrating its scientific interest are thus related issues, and 
resolving them requires a shift in evidence collecting methods and priorities. 
42. The plasticity-first hypothesis and its rivals. I'll begin by introducing the plasticity-first 
hypothesis, its theoretical rivals, and the controversy between them. The plasticity-first 
hypothesis proposes that because organisms are developmentally plastic (i.e. sensitive to 
environmental inputs), a process of environmental induction followed by genetic assimilation is 
an evolutionarily significant mechanism for the emergence of phenotypic novelties (West-
Eberhard 2003; Moczek et al. 2011).3
It’s easiest to understand this hypothesis in light of an example. Stickleback are small fish
that inhabit oceans, lakes, streams, and estuaries throughout the northern hemisphere. 
Stickleback from different habitats have different mouth shapes. Experiments have shown that 
many of these differences are due to environmental factors rather than genetic ones. For instance,
if you capture juvenile fish from a stream habitat and feed them zooplankton rather than 
bloodworms, they will develop mouth phenotypes typical of lake-dwelling fish (Lucek et al. 
2014). Dietary changes can also induce fish from the surface of a lake to develop mouths typical 
of fish that live on lake bottoms (Wund et al. 2008). Thus, stickleback are developmentally 
plastic for mouth shape.
When developmentally plastic individuals encounter new environmental conditions, they 
sometimes develop new phenotypes in response (Waddington 1953; 1956), where a new 
phenotype is simply one that differs qualitatively or quantitatively from the other phenotypes that
a genotype has produced in the population's recent history.4 This phenomenon is called 
3 “Phenotypic novelty” is a term of art with a narrower meaning than “new phenotype.” To be considered a 
novelty, a phenotype must differ from its predecessors in some important way, but the biological literature is still
divided on what is required for something to count as a novelty (for a review, see Wagner and Lynch 2010). My 
conception follows Pigliucci's (2008), according to which novelties are “new traits or behaviors, or novel 
combinations of new traits or behaviors, arising during the evolution of a lineage, and that perform a new 
function within the ecology of that lineage” (p. 890). The plasticity-first hypothesis is not committed to any one 
conception of novelty. Instead, the hypothesis claims that plasticity-first evolution is part of the explanation for 
the origin of some traits which will count as novelties on whatever conception(s) biologists adopt.
4 Not all new phenotypes count as true phenotypic novelties, but they may still serve as the foundation for the 
evolution of future novelties.
5environmental induction: the appearance (and recurrence) of a new developmental variant which 
occurs when some new environmental input affects a preexisting responsive phenotype, causing 
a phenotypic change or reorganization (modified from West-Eberhard 2003, p. 140). Of course, 
all traits are developmentally dependent on both genetic and environmental inputs, but the 
concept of environmental induction is useful to biologists because it foregrounds the difference-
making role that the environment plays in some cases of development that it does not play in 
other cases. 
Environmental conditions do not only generate phenotypic variation; if they are 
intergenerationally stable, they may allow for the transmission of phenotypic variation by 
inducing it anew in each generation, as parents expose their offspring to developmental 
environments similar to those in which they themselves matured. Suppose the inducing 
conditions are stable across generations and the induced phenotypic variant is adaptive. An 
example might be a population of stream-dwelling stickleback that migrate to a lake and whose 
mouth phenotypes respond plastically to prey availability. Then natural selection will prefer the 
induced phenotype. The genotypes that are capable of producing the adaptive variant will 
become more frequent, while the genotypes that are not will dwindle.5 This is genetic evolution 
(change in allele frequencies across generations due to natural selection), but it does not require 
new genetic variants.6 
Evolution by selection of an environmentally induced phenotype may not seem powerful 
because the adaptive variants maintained by environmental induction are fragile. If, for example, 
the stickleback population leaves the lake and migrates back to a stream, the new mouth 
5 Here I make the realistic assumption that there is genetic variation for plasticity in the population. If all members
of the population are equally plastic, then, of course, natural selection will not occur.
6 The term for this kind of evolution by selection of a phenotypic variant is genetic accommodation. Though both 
environmentally and genetically induced variants can be genetically accommodated (Crispo 2007), here I am 
interested only in genetic accommodation of environmentally induced traits. 
6phenotype will disappear as environmental conditions change. Insofar as evolutionary biology 
aims to explain the evolution of complex traits that depend on the slow accumulation of 
phenotypic changes over long time periods and varied environmental conditions, we may be 
skeptical of how relevant these traits can be. 
There is, however, a further process called genetic assimilation7 that can reduce the 
dependency of environmentally induced traits on their initial inducing conditions. Genetic 
assimilation occurs when changes in the genetic basis of an induced trait make the trait more 
adaptive, but less plastic. The more adaptive genetic variants have a selective advantage, so they 
spread throughout the population, and the genetic system gains more control over the 
environmentally induced trait. Eventually, the trait will develop even in the absence of the 
original inducing conditions, meaning it is no longer environmentally induced. Once this transfer
of developmental control from the environment to the genome occurs, the trait is more likely to 
figure in future episodes of cumulative evolution.
A final component of the plasticity-first hypothesis that needs definition is evolutionary 
significance. Advocates of the hypothesis are vague about the meaning of this term, but as I 
understand it, their primary concern is the explanatory significance of the plasticity-first 
hypothesis, meaning that the plasticity-first hypothesis provides part of the answer to a central 
problem in evolutionary theory, the problem of how phenotypic novelties emerge and spread.8 If 
plasticity-first evolution is explanatorily significant, then a satisfactory resolution of the problem 
of novelty will invoke it as a key novelty-generating mechanism. I am following the literature 
here by speaking of one general problem of novelty in evolutionary theory (Muller and Wagner 
7  A related process is called the Baldwin effect, but the Baldwin effect picks out cases in which plasticity helps 
organisms survive in a new environment without being followed by plasticity loss or further adaptation of the 
plastic trait(s) (Crispo 2007).
8 This conception of explanatory significance is drawn from Godfrey-Smith's (2001) analysis of explanatory 
adaptationism and Orzack and Sober's (1994) I-adaptationism thesis.
71991), but it might also be productive to approach the issue more narrowly, asking about the role
of plasticity-first evolution in the appearance of novelties in particular clades. 
How do we determine if plasticity-first evolution is a key novelty-generating mechanism, 
either in general or in particular clades? Frequency is one consideration, but presumably 
plasticity-first evolution can be evolutionarily significant even if it is somewhat rare. For 
example, if plasticity-first evolution has produced high-profile phenotypic novelties such as 
limbs (Standen et al. 2014), bipedalism (Pigliucci 2008), types of social learning (Sterelny 2012),
or CAM photosynthesis (West-Eberhard et al. 2011), then these are reasons to think it meets the 
significance threshold. So, evidence for the significance of the plasticity-first hypothesis can be 
evidence about either its frequency or its role in the emergence of particular high-profile 
novelties.
Judgments of explanatory significance depend in part on philosophical considerations 
about the nature of explanations, particularly historical explanations, but the issue is also beset 
by empirical difficulties. These stem from the fact that it is challenging to discriminate between 
plasticity-first evolution and alternative explanations for the emergence of novelties. There are 
three of these alternative explanations: novelty from coding mutations, novelty from non-coding 
(regulatory) mutations, and novelty from recombination, which is the reshuffling of genetic 
material on or between chromosomes. Unlike plasticity-first evolution, in which is phenotypes 
change before genes do, these mechanisms all involve gene-first changes. It is difficult to 
determine which of these mechanisms is responsible for any particular phenotypic novelty 
because researchers have to make inferences about past events on the basis of presently available
data, but both phenotype-first and gene-first mechanisms produce the same evolutionary 
outcomes—phenotypic novelties and genetic adaptations. Researchers need additional evidence 
8to confirm or disconfirm the plasticity-first hypothesis, but there is no consensus on what data 
would be sufficient for this purpose.  
3. Evidential disagreements. The scientific debate about the plasticity-first hypothesis is 
dominated by two issues: the quality of direct versus indirect evidence and proper placement of 
the burden of proof. In this section I show that, in focusing on these issues, the debate has 
neglected substantive questions about what data would qualify as confirmatory evidence for 
plasticity-first evolution and how to obtain such evidence. I also identify two evidential standards
that need to be met in order for the plasticity-first hypothesis to be confirmed. First, the evidence 
must be discriminatory, i.e., for at least some novelties, it must favor the plasticity-first 
explanation over the alternative gene-first explanations. Second, the evidence must be relevant to
the significance claim embedded in the hypothesis.
3.1 Direct and indirect evidence
Advocates of the plasticity-first hypothesis characterize the evidence for their position as 
indirect, rather than direct (West-Eberhard 2003; Pigliucci and Murren 2003). They argue that 
plasticity-first evolution, like many other evolutionary mechanisms, is difficult to observe 
directly, and therefore, it is unreasonable to ask (as some skeptics do) for direct evidence for the 
hypothesis before accepting it. Instead, researchers can test the hypothesis by collecting indirect 
evidence. This indirect evidence usually consists of comparisons between ancestral and 
descendant populations (i.e., studies that compare characteristics of a descendant population to 
those of an ancestral one). Scientists less friendly to the plasticity-first hypothesis criticize the 
reliance on indirect evidence (de Jong 2003; 2005). In fact, there is a long tradition of skepticism
9about plasticity-first evolution that continues despite detailed reviews showcasing the latest 
empirical work on the topic (Wund 2012; Schlichting and Wund 2014). 
For all their disagreements, skeptics and advocates do agree that the distinction between 
direct and indirect evidence generates the controversy about the evidential status of the 
plasticity-first hypothesis. Advocates accept indirect evidence as confirmatory; skeptics do not; 
and both sides are aware of this. But what exactly is direct evidence? That is far from clear. In 
fact, there are as many as four different and plausible interpretations of the direct/indirect 
distinction.
The first and most straightforward interpretation of the distinction is that obtaining direct 
evidence means actually observing the hypothesized event happen in the wild (though additional 
laboratory experiments may be needed to supplement these observations). All other evidence, by 
contrast, is indirect. Call this the distinction between direct and indirect observation.9. It is 
tempting to read the skeptics' demand for direct evidence as demands for direct observation, 
especially calls for a “crucial laboratory experiment” (de Jong 2003, p. 17) to confirm the 
hypothesis. Direct observation is not, however, the typical standard against which evidence for 
an evolutionary hypothesis is judged, so it is perhaps unfair to interpret skeptics as calling for it. 
Inferences about the occurrence of natural selection in the wild are rarely direct in this sense 
(Endler 1986), nor is research on speciation (Wund 2012). Though there are rare exceptions 
(Grant and Grant 2009), biologists almost never witness speciation events from beginning to end.
If the skeptics' really are appealing to direct observation in their criticisms of plasticity-first 
evolution, then they are holding the hypothesis to an unreasonably high standard. 
9 I am offering this as a plausible interpretation of the direct/indirect evidence distinction as it arises in the debate 
about plasticity-first evolution, not as an endorsement of the idea that laboratory observations are not direct 
observations. In Section 5 I will discuss the role of laboratory observations, particularly laboratory natural 
selection, in resolving this debate.
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A second interpretation of the skeptics' calls for direct evidence is that they want 
evidence for the occurrence of plasticity-first evolution in particular cases to discriminate 
between plasticity-first evolution and the alternative mechanisms that can also produce new 
phenotypes. On this interpretation, direct evidence is discriminatory; to be considered direct 
evidence, a dataset must favor the plasticity-first explanation for the emergence of a particular 
novelty over the alternative gene-first mechanisms. Indirect evidence, by contrast, is data that is 
consistent with plasticity-first evolution, but not discriminatory. On this construal, demanding 
direct evidence for the plasticity-first hypothesis is completely reasonable. In fact, from the 
perspective of confirmation theory, data that is not direct in this sense is not evidence at all. 
When data fails to discriminate, it fails to provide evidence, and the result is a kind of 
underdetermination problem called contrast failure (Forber 2009). If this is what skeptics mean 
when they call for “clear empirical evidence” (Santos et al. 2015, p. 128) and “direct support,” 
(de Jong 2005), then they are simply denying that the advocates have offered discriminatory 
evidence for the plasticity-first hypothesis.  
Yet another way of drawing the distinction between direct and indirect evidence is to say 
that direct evidence for the plasticity-first hypothesis must be relevant to the significance claim 
embedded in the hypothesis. If evidence merely raises the probability that plasticity-first 
evolution occurred in this or that particular case but does not speak to overall significance, it is 
indirect. This conception of direct evidence allows skeptics to concede that some evidence for 
plasticity-first evolution is discriminatory, but still deny that this evidence is significance-
relevant because it does not tell us how frequent plasticity-first evolution is or whether it is 
responsible for high-profile evolutionary novelties. Direct evidence as significance-relevant 
evidence is a plausible interpretation of at least some of the plasticity-first  skeptics. See, for 
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example, Wray et al.'s call to “strengthen the evidence for [the] importance” (in Laland et al. 
2014, p. 164) of phenotypic plasticity.
Though interpreting the skeptics as calling for either discriminatory or significance-
relevant evidence is both charitable and plausible, it is clear that neither of these is the distinction
advocates have in mind when they talk about direct and indirect evidence. Advocates of the 
plasticity-first hypothesis do not make the claim that the hypothesis should be adopted on the 
basis of evidence that lacks discriminatory power or fails to address the significance of plasticity-
first evolution. Rather, their claim is that indirect evidence can be both discriminatory and 
significance-relevant. 
Advocates use the distinction between direct and indirect evidence in two different ways. 
First, they sometimes mean that direct evidence is observationally direct, as in Pigliucci and 
Murren's (2003, p. 1462) reference to catching genetic assimilation “in the act.” Second, they 
sometimes interpret calls for direct evidence as calls to demonstrate each element of the larger 
plasticity-first hypothesis within one model system or, even more stringently, in a single study. 
According to Wund and Schlichting (2014), such integrated evidence is desirable, but not a 
requirement on confirmatory evidence. Wund argues that asking for such a demonstration in one 
study is a “flawed expectation” (2012, p. 6), because, like the observational directness 
requirement, it holds the plasticity-first hypothesis to a higher standard than that used for 
analogous hypotheses. What advocates are sometimes defending when they speak about indirect 
evidence, then, is that it is possible to obtain discriminatory evidence in a piecemeal fashion by 
splitting the larger plasticity-first process into smaller units and then investigating these units 
across different experiments and model systems.
These four different ways of distinguishing between direct and indirect evidence are 
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blurred together in the plasticity-first  debate. Advocates talk about direct evidence both in terms 
of direct observation and integration. These may also be the conceptions of directness that 
skeptics have in mind, but if they are, then important questions about the extent to which the data
on plasticity-first evolution is discriminatory and significance-relevant are ignored. 
Alternatively, if skeptics are arguing that evidence for plasticity-first evolution needs to be 
discriminatory and/or significance-relevant, then they are indeed raising important questions 
about confirmation, but the two sides are talking past one another. In either case, the debate has 
yet to produce a clear discussion of whether the data on plasticity-first evolution manages to be 
discriminatory or significance-relevant. And such a discussion is critical to understanding the 
relationship between the plasticity-first hypothesis and the evidence for it. 
3.2 Burden of proof
One way in which advocates have tried to address worries about discriminatory evidence 
is by claiming that there is often evidential parity between plasticity-first hypothesis and its 
theoretical rivals; that is, that phenotype-first mechanisms and gene-first mechanisms enjoy 
comparable levels of evidential support in many particular cases. This burden of proof argument 
concedes that we often do not know whether a population's evolutionary history involved genetic
assimilation, but it claims we that also do not know whether and how often that population has 
evolved novelties by gene-first mechanisms (Pigliucci et al. 2006). Biologists have long assumed
that the gene-first mechanisms account for most if not all phenotypic novelties, but only because 
there was no alternative hypothesis that fit the available evidence. But now the plasticity-first 
hypothesis presents just such an alternative. As a result, we have learned that some data once 
thought to support the occurrence and significance of gene-first evolutionary mechanisms is not 
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actually fine-grained enough to discriminate between phenotype-first and gene-first explanations.
According to the burden of proof argument, when skeptics talk as though the evidence for
gene-first mechanisms greatly outweighs the evidence for phenotype-first mechanisms, they are 
overlooking the fact that the mere construction of a plausible rival hypothesis can create an 
underdetermination problem, independent of the strength of the evidence for that rival 
hypothesis. It is important not to overstate this burden of proof claim, however. Unless advocates
of plasticity-first evolution mean to make the radical assertion that there is no evidence for gene-
first mechanisms that is not subject to a plasticity-first interpretation, the most the argument can 
do is lead us to adjust our priors concerning the plausibility of plasticity-first evolution, not 
deliver evidential parity across the board.
In any case, the burden of proof argument is a double-edged sword. If, as advocates 
generally concede, gene-first and phenotype-first explanations are often underdetermined relative
to the present evidence, the argument does not give us reason to accept the plasticity-first 
hypothesis. At best, we should suspend judgment about the relative importance of gene-first and 
phenotype-first mechanisms because we do not have evidence that can help us determine which 
mechanism was active in particular evolutionary episodes, much less give us information about 
the relative frequency and significance of these mechanisms. It is therefore important to face the 
issues of discriminatory and significance-relevant evidence head-on. It is to these issues that I 
turn next. There are substantive questions about confirmation and the plasticity-first hypothesis 
that the debate surrounding the hypothesis has not addressed. How can they be resolved?
4. The importance of middle range theory. In this section I argue that to be in a position to say 
what data would be discriminatory and significance-relevant, researchers need a richer middle 
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range theory of plasticity-first evolution, one that allows them to identify its distinctive empirical
traces.10 A middle range theory is a theory of the relationship between a process of interest and 
the observable evidence it produces (Binford 1982; Jeffares 2008). Such a theory allows 
scientists to guard against false positives and false negatives, and to address worries about the 
degradation of evidential traces over time.
First I revisit the possibility of confirming the hypothesis by observing it in a natural 
population. I have already claimed that this sense of direct evidence is an unreasonably high 
evidential standard, and that it is a mistake to say that only observations of natural populations 
count as direct. Here, I show that such evidence is also unable to confirm the plasticity-first 
hypothesis because it so rarely yields discriminatory evidence. Then I show that for similar 
reasons, ancestral-descendant comparisons, the most popular means of studying plasticity-first 
evolution, are not sufficient to confirm the hypothesis as long as our middle range theory remains
as rudimentary as it currently is. 
4.1 Direct observation
Skeptics and advocates agree that the ideal way to gather evidence about plasticity-first 
evolution would be to watch it happen, and though demanding this ideal is unreasonable, there is 
still value in thinking about what researchers would have to observe in the ideal case in order to 
conclude that plasticity-first evolution was occurring. To observe environmental induction and 
genetic assimilation in real time, biologists would first need to identify a population undergoing 
rapid evolution in the wild. In such a population, there are seven observations which, taken 
together, would establish that a novel trait evolved by plasticity-first evolution rather than some 
10 These traces need not be unique, just distinct enough to allow us to discriminate between the plasticity-first 
hypothesis and the competing alternative explanations for the origin of evolutionary novelties.
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competing alternative mechanism:
(i) Emergence of a novel phenotype: some members of the population develop a 
phenotype (e.g. smaller eyes or narrower pectoral bones) that was not formerly 
present in the population and which performs a new function in the ecology of the 
lineage. 
(ii)  Presence of an inducer: the population experiences a novel and intergenerationally
stable environmental condition such as a change in salinity, conductivity, 
temperature, or nutrient availability. 
(iii) Causal link between inducer and novel phenotype: the inducer is the 
difference-maker between the novel phenotype emerging or not emerging. 
(iv) Adaptiveness of the novel phenotype: the novel phenotype has a fitness benefit in 
the novel environment.
(v) Genetic basis of the novel phenotype: the same genetic variants that underpin the 
novel phenotype were associated with a different phenotype before the 
introduction of the inducer. 
(vi) Spread of the novel phenotype: the adaptive phenotype must spread throughout 
the population. 
(vii) Subsequent selection on the novel phenotype: once (or as) the novel phenotype 
spreads, changes in its genetic basis that further improve its form, function, or 
regulation are selected, leading to the persistence of the novel phenotype even in 
the absence of the original inducer.
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 Pursuing such direct confirmation of the plasticity-first hypothesis has a number of 
disadvantages. First, biologists must have the good fortune to catch a natural population in the 
act of rapid evolution, as well as the ability to identify in advance what trait to measure. As 
challenging as this seems, it may not be impossible (Moczek 2007). Second, provided biologists 
can pass this first hurdle, the ensuing research would be difficult, time-consuming, and 
expensive. Third, it is a forward-looking approach, and cannot tell us about evolutionary 
episodes that have already happened. If direct observation were the only evidence-gathering 
option, then we would not be able to answer questions about plasticity-first evolution versus 
some alternative in particular historical cases. Finally, one or two or even ten direct observations 
do not amount to confirmation of the significance claim embedded in the plasticity-first 
hypothesis except in the unlikely event that the observation is of a high-profile novelty.11 
To demonstrate evolutionary significance, we have to be able to generalize beyond a few 
observations and make inferences about how often and under what conditions plasticity-first 
evolution occurs. Making these inferences requires more information than the mere fact of direct 
observations. Thus, even if successful, direct observation is not significance-relevant and so does
not confirm the plasticity-first hypothesis. Direct observations might be very powerful evidence 
if combined with additional data generated by other methodological approaches, but they do not, 
in isolation, have much confirmatory power.
The conceit of the idealized data set also highlights the difficulties of using techniques 
other than direct observation to confirm the plasticity-first hypothesis. The primary difficulty is 
that induction and assimilation occur quickly (probably over several tens of generations), and 
such transient processes do not leave stable and easily detectable empirical traces in their wake. 
11 I say “unlikely” because novelties such as the tetrapod limb take many, many human lifetimes to evolve.
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Most of the evidence of past evolution that is readily accessible tells us only that both genes and 
phenotypes change over time, but not the order in which those changes occur.  
In the case of direct observation, researchers' ability to collect dynamic, rather than static,
data (Forber 2009; Lewontin 2002) could provide insight into the ordering of genetic change and
phenotypic change. The challenge for other evidence gathering techniques is to devise 
approximations of dynamic data from static data. This, of course, is a problem common to the 
historical sciences rather than a unique issue for the plasticity-first hypothesis. The general 
solution to the problem requires researchers to search out physical traces left by past events. 
Their goal is to find a signature: a trace or set of traces that uniquely picks out one of the 
mechanisms under consideration. Sometimes, a single trace, or “smoking gun” may serve to 
discriminate between alternatives, though more often, multiple independent traces must converge
in order to rule out one alternative and confirm another (Cleland 2002; Forber and Griffith 2011; 
Currie forthcoming). Of course, there is no guarantee that every mechanism or process of interest
has a signature (Turner 2007), but it often happens that methodological and technical advances 
uncover confirming traces that scientists previously believed were inaccessible (Currie 2015; 
Turner 2016). 
How can researchers identify the signature of a process like plasticity-first evolution? 
This is where middle range theory becomes important. When the distinctive empirical traces of a 
process are not apparent, researchers must invest in developing a theory about the relationship 
between the process they are interested in and the observable evidence the process produces. 
Once armed with the appropriate middle range theory, researchers can confirm plasticity-first 
evolution in particular cases without directly observing it. They can determine which data is 
actually discriminatory, and then design studies of evolutionary episodes that seek out the 
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relevant signature. When they find the signature, they can rule out alternative explanations and 
conclude that plasticity-first evolution has occurred.
Even more importantly, the signature of plasticity-first evolution can assist researchers in 
the project of making generalizations about evolutionary significance. They can use the signature
to compile a database of individual cases of plasticity-first evolution, as well as confirmed cases 
of gene-first novelties, and then use this database to support inferences about the frequency of 
plasticity-first evolution, what if any distinctive modes and tempos of evolution it produces, and 
the probability that particular high-profile novelties emerged due to plasticity-first evolution. 
This kind of information is necessary to respond to skeptics who worry that the distinction 
between plasticity-first evolution and gene-first evolution is explanatorily inert.
4.2 Ancestral-descendant comparisons 
Unfortunately, research on plasticity-first evolution is not focused on developing middle 
range theory or characterizing a signature. Advocates have identified one empirical trace which 
under certain conditions provides discriminatory evidence for plasticity-first evolution, and they 
focus instead on carrying out ancestral-descendant comparisons, i.e. studies that compare 
characteristics of a descendant population to those of an ancestral one, that provide this kind of 
evidence.12 Researchers may compare genomic information, when it is available, but most often 
they test for plasticity in the development of particular traits. When (a) a descendant population 
has phenotypically diverged from its ancestors in ways that appear to be adaptive and (b) the 
ancestral population shows plasticity for the trait(s) that have evolved in the descendants, 
12  Of course, researchers cannot look at the literal ancestral populations (because they are dead), but must identify 
extant populations that are reasonable analogs of the true ancestors. Identifying such proxy ancestral populations 
is a general problem in evolutionary biology rather than a problem that is particular to the plasticity-first 
hypothesis, so I will not take it up in this paper.
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researchers take this as evidence that induced plastic responses in the ancestors drove subsequent
evolution in their descendants.13
But the inferences one can draw from these comparative studies are more limited than 
advocates admit. There are two reasons. First, many ancestral-descendant comparisons are not 
discriminatory because they provide evidence about either environmental induction or genetic 
assimilation, but not both. Second, those studies that are discriminatory are too rare to support 
inferences about evolutionary significance.
In order to rule out a gene-first explanation for a particular novelty, a study needs to show
that both environmental induction and genetic assimilation occurred in the same population. It is 
not sufficient to show the independent occurrence of just one or the other, because the 
independent occurrence of either of these processes is compatible with a gene-first explanation 
for phenotypic novelty.
Consider the stickleback example from Section 2. Recently diverged lake and stream 
stickleback populations have adaptive differences in mouth shape, and you can experimentally 
induce the lake phenotype in stream-dwelling fish (and vice versa). This case provides 
compelling evidence for adaptive plasticity in both stickleback populations. But it does not allow
us to make inferences about plasticity-first evolution in these populations. The newer mouth 
phenotype may be the precursor to a true evolutionary novelty, or it may not. At present, the 
descendant stickleback population is as plastic as the ancestral one, meaning that genetic 
assimilation has not occurred. We have no evidence that any genetic changes have occurred to 
make the adaptive new phenotype more stable, that the induced response is on its way to 
becoming constitutive, that the stickleback population(s) will become less plastic with respect to 
13  The full set of data that researchers look for is a bit more detailed (see Levis and Pfennig 2016), but these are the 
key findings.
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this trait in the future, or that the new phenotype will figure in their subsequent evolution. 
A second example is Carol Lee's work on marine copepod invasions of freshwater 
habitats, work which supports conclusions about genetic assimilation, but not environmental 
induction. In order to invade a freshwater habitat, these tiny marine crustaceans must evolve new
ion regulation mechanisms. Lee et al. (2011) studied the role of two enzymes (V-type H ATPase 
and Na/K ATPase) involved in copepod ion transportation and showed that copepods from 
marine habitats in the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico rapidly evolved increased plasticity for
enzyme function when exposed to freshwater conditions. This increased plasticity was adaptive 
because it improved the copepods' ability to survive in freshwater. Further, copepod populations 
that have already made the transition from seawater to freshwater show less plasticity for enzyme
function than Lee's experimental populations, supporting the conclusion that these invading 
populations have genetically assimilated a previous plastic response. But it's an open question 
whether plasticity in the original invaders existed before the invasion, or if a regulatory mutation 
following the invasion increased plasticity (a gene-first mechanism). If anything, the study 
supports the latter possibility, since Lee's experimental population evolved increased plasticity 
for ion regulation after exposure to novel salinity levels rather than demonstrating plasticity 
immediately. 
Advocates cite these examples, and others like them, as evidence for the plasticity-first 
hypothesis. In a sense, they are correct. Ancestral-descendant comparisons support the plasticity-
first hypothesis by deepening our understanding of how and when developmental plasticity, 
environmental induction, genetic assimilation occur. By demonstrating individual components of
the hypothesis, these studies also lend plausibility to the claim that the entire process occurs in 
nature sometimes. They help to build a circumstantial case for plasticity-first evolution. But 
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circumstantial evidence isn't good enough, because the plasticity-first hypothesis does not merely
claim that plasticity-first evolution probably occurs in nature sometimes. It claims that plasticity-
first evolution is an evolutionarily significant novelty-generating mechanism. To support that 
claim, we need to be able to connect the plasticity-first  process to particular novelties, and that 
requires us to be able to discriminate between gene-first and phenotype-first explanations in 
particular cases (some researchers do recognize this explicitly, see Levis and Pfennig 2016).
The second problem with ancestral-descendant comparisons is that even when they are 
discriminatory, there are very few candidate model systems that can support conclusions about 
evolutionary significance, and these model systems have special characteristics which make it 
difficult to generalize from them. Ancestral-derived comparisons require recently diverged 
population pairs in which the descendants have adaptively diverged from the ancestors. Adaptive
radiations (e.g. African cichlid fish and stickleback) and recent invasions (e.g. copepods and 
tiger snakes) are good sources for such pairs, but there are many additional features that 
populations need to have that further narrows down the set of good candidates for an integrated 
demonstration of plasticity-first evolution (Levis and Pfennig 2016). If we want to be able to 
make inferences about older evolutionary novelties or about novelties that did not originate in the
context of invasions or adaptive radiations, special cases are of limited value. Even if researchers
can demonstrate plasticity-first evolution in each of these model systems, they still need a way to
leverage these demonstrations into sources of evidence about other evolutionary episodes to 
which our access is more limited. So there is an important gap between discriminatory evidence 
and significance-relevant evidence. The best way to bridge this gap is to search for additional 
empirical traces of plasticity-first evolution. If we identify additional traces, we can expand the 
set of confirmed cases of plasticity-first evolution that forms the basis for significance 
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judgments. That's why it is important to enrich the middle range theory of plasticity-first 
evolution. We need to build up our understanding of how the process occurs and the kinds of 
marks it leaves on the world so that we can identify tokens of the process when we encounter 
them and tell tokens of different processes apart. 
There are a couple of ways to enrich the middle range theory and find more traces. One 
approach, which would not require much of a shift from researchers' current methodology, is to 
continue doing ancestral-descendant comparisons, but to look for additional traces in model 
systems where it is already established that plasticity-first evolution has occurred. These 
additional traces might then be identifiable in other natural populations, even ones that are not 
ideal for conducting ancestral-derived comparisons. Researchers have not yet tried this strategy, 
perhaps because there are still no uncontroversial demonstrations of plasticity-first evolution in a
natural population (Levis and Pfennig 2016). 
Other approaches to characterizing the signature of plasticity-first evolution depart more 
significantly from existing methodological norms. In fact, they go against truisms about quality 
of evidence espoused by many researchers. The approaches I have in mind are experimental 
evolution and formal modeling.
5. Adjusting methodological norms. Researchers recognize that formal models and 
experimental evolution can contribute to the study of plasticity-first evolution, but they also grant
epistemic priority to data from natural populations. According to Schlichting and Wund (2014), 
“Ancestral-descendant or sister taxon comparisons provide the strongest evidence that genetic 
accommodation is frequent in nature” (p. 665-6). They also write that:
Although experimental evolution studies provide definitive evidence for 
demonstrating both the possibility and mechanisms of genetic accommodation, 
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evidence from natural populations is preferable for indicating the prevalence of 
this process in nature (p. 660-661).
Similarly, Levis and Pfennig (2016) tell us that “studying the plasticity-first hypothesis in lab 
populations of rapidly evolving organisms would be worthwhile but would not clarify whether 
plasticity has contributed to adaptation in any natural population” (p. 3).
These biologists are correct that we must ultimately refer to data from natural populations
to assess the historical evolutionary significance of plasticity-first evolution. But in drawing this 
conclusion, they discount the critical role of other methodological techniques in determining 
what kind of data from natural populations they should look for. This discounting shows up not 
only in their explicit statements about evidence, but in their concrete research recommendations 
as well. And it echoes the deep-seated yet dubious idea that certain kinds of experiments enjoy 
some in-principle epistemic privilege relative to other investigative techniques (Parke 2014).
Such discounting is a mistake because, though the literature on plasticity offers some 
clues about what additional traces of plasticity-first evolution might be, the area is largely 
uncharted territory. One suggestion is that the time scale of plasticity-first evolution is much 
shorter than that of gene-first mechanisms (Lande 2009). If so, researchers may be able to make 
inferences about which process is more likely in cases where they have information about the 
rate of evolution. Authors also occasionally reference a possible genomic signature of plasticity-
first evolution that distinguishes it from gene-first processes. Characterizing such a signature 
would allow for inferences and generalizations that go beyond those licensed by ancestral-
derived comparisons. 
The ease of suggesting and imagining possible signatures of plasticity-first evolution 
raises the question of how these possibilities can be tested. Researchers are, after all, in a 
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paradoxical position. In order to identify distinctive characteristics of plasticity-first evolution, 
they need clear cases of plasticity-first evolution to observe and manipulate. But in order to 
identify such cases, they need some prior knowledge about its distinctive characteristics. 
This chicken and egg problem arises because it is almost prohibitively difficult to identify
cases of plasticity-first evolution in nature. But there is another option: researchers can construct 
cases of plasticity-first evolution for themselves. Experimental evolution and formal modeling 
confer this ability. Not only do they allow researchers to construct cases of plasticity-first 
evolution, they make it possible to observe plasticity-first processes in real time, not just once, 
but many times over. Thus, these techniques allow for more direct observation and manipulation 
of plasticity-first evolution than comparative studies do. They are better suited for the tasks of 
developing middle range theory and characterizing the signature of plasticity-first evolution than 
studies of natural populations are.
To illustrate the value of the formal modeling and experimental evolution, I will discuss 
the case of selective sweeps, in which these techniques are already helping to elucidate the 
signatures of evolutionary processes. Then I will consider how an extension of this approach 
could contribute to the study of plasticity-first evolution. The growing literature on how to assess
the plasticity-first hypothesis has not seriously entertained the kind of strategy I am advancing 
here, but the limitations of comparative studies demand that we combine them with different 
approaches. 
5.1 Formal modeling and experimental evolution 
Before introducing the selective sweep example, I will review the modeling and 
experimental techniques I have in mind. Both traditional quantitative genetic models and agent-
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based simulations are useful for investigating the signature of plasticity-first evolution. 
Quantitative genetic models can generate empirically testable predictions about the differences 
between gene-first and phenotype-first processes, predictions which can guide future 
experimental set-ups and parameter choices. For instance, the prediction that plasticity-first 
evolution is more rapid than gene-first evolution comes from the quantitative genetic literature 
(Lande 2009; Frank 2011). 
Simulations, by contrast, allow biologists to set up both phenotype-first and genotype-
first evolutionary scenarios, run them thousands of times, and then look for interesting 
differences in outcome between the two kinds of scenarios. If they can be externally validated, 
these differences will be diagnostic of plasticity-first evolution in natural populations. An 
intriguing example of this kind of strategy comes from Draghi and Whitlock (2012), who 
simulated evolution of a gene-network model in three different of environments. They use the 
model to investigate the genetic basis of traits that have evolved as plastic responses to 
environmental variation, but it's an approach that could also investigate plasticity-first evolution 
and identify features of plasticity first evolution that differ from gene-first evolution.
Experimental evolution is “research in which populations are studied across multiple 
generations under defined and reproducible conditions, whether in the laboratory or in nature” 
(Garland and Rose 2009, p. 3). This broad definition encompasses a range of experimental 
techniques as varied as artificial selection, laboratory natural selection, habitat alteration, and 
monitoring invasive species. What sets these approaches apart is their ability to generate 
dynamic, rather than static, data about a population's response to selection (Parke, in 
preparation). 
Of these experimental techniques, artificial selection, which involves breeding 
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populations in a laboratory setting and selecting for a particular trait each generation, have 
played an outsized role in research on plasticity-first evolution. Some of the earliest empirical 
investigations of the hypothesis were artificial selection experiments. Waddington (1953; 1956) 
reduced the activity of the Hsp90 protein (Rutherford and Lindquist 1998) by exposing fruit fly 
larvae to heat shock, which induced a new phenotype: wings without cross-veined patterns. After
several generations of artificial selection for this phenotype, it developed consistently even 
without the heat shock treatment that originally induced it.14 
Today, Waddington's study is regarded as the classic proof of possibility of genetic 
assimilation, but the artificial selection method suffers from two limitations which consign 
results such as Waddington's to second-best status in the eyes of many researchers. First, the 
novel phenotype Waddington induced is not adaptive. Second, it is not clear whether the 
inducing condition, heat shock, is one that a natural population of fruit flies would ever 
encounter. These two limitations highlight what many see as a more general drawback of 
artificial selection experiments—the difficulty of using them to make inferences about selective 
processes in nature (Rohner et al. 2013). 
Laboratory natural selection (LNS) is an approach that circumvents these limitations. In 
LNS, “the experimenter divides replicate lines among two or more environmental treatments and
examines how the experimental stocks respond over time” (Fuller et al. 2005, p. 391). The key 
difference between artificial selection and LNS is that the experimenter does not choose which 
individuals will reproduce in each generation. As a result, any phenotypic novelties that emerge 
over the course of the experiment are adaptive responses to the experimental population's 
environmental treatment. If these environmental treatments are reasonable approximations of 
14 See Suzuki and Nijhout 2006, 2008 for additional examples of artificial selection studies.
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selection pressures the experimental population might encounter outside the lab, then the 
limitations of artificial selection experiments are not problems for LNS. 
LNS should be more common because it is an ideal method for characterizing the 
signature of plasticity.15  Once researchers have evolved a novel phenotype and then confirmed 
the mechanism by which it occurred (gene-first or phenotype first.), they can go back and 
reexamine data from each time-step of the process in search of distinctive, identifying patterns. 
They can even contrast cases in which different mechanisms predominate and look for 
divergences between them.
5.2 An example: selective sweeps
These techniques—quantitative genetic models, simulations, and LNS—have all 
contributed to attempts to find empirical differences between adaptation from standing genetic 
variation and adaptation from new (de novo) mutations. This project is related to plasticity-first  
research, but the contrast between standing variation and de novo mutations does not perfectly 
overlap the one between gene-first and phenotype-first mechanisms. De novo mutation includes 
both coding and non-coding mutations, while standing variation includes cases of recombination,
environmental induction, and selection of phenotypes that already exist in a population at low 
frequency (so, not novelties at all).  So, when biologists ask about the relative frequency of 
adaptation from standing genetic variation, they are asking about something importantly different
from plasticity-first evolution. Still, the techniques that are helping to identify the first kind of 
signature may also help characterize the second.
Biologists try to distinguish between adaptation from standing variation and de novo 
15 For one rare case, see Lachapelle et al. 2015.
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mutation by looking for differences in what are called selective sweeps. Selective sweeps occur 
when the alleles that are located near an adaptive allele under natural selection also get selected 
for. The resulting reduction in genetic variation surrounding the allele under direct selection is 
called a selective sweep. Selective sweeps are both weaker and narrower if selection is for 
standing genetic variation rather than a de novo mutation because a de novo mutation is selected 
for from the moment it appears, while standing variation is neutral for a time before it becomes 
adaptive in a new environment. Previously neutral alleles can reach intermediate frequency in a 
population without ever being under direct selection. Once they are under direct selection, they 
sweep through a population more quickly than a de novo mutation would, and this is what 
creates the weaker and narrower (or, soft, as opposed to hard) sweep pattern (Barrett and 
Schluter 2008). 
We have this prediction about selective sweeps because of formal modeling. And, though
looking for hard and soft sweeps is far from a perfect method for distinguishing between de novo
adaptations and adaptation from standing variation (Teshima et al. 2006), it is a helpful tool, and 
one that improves over time as modeling approaches become more sophisticated (for an example
of such increased sophistication, see Peter et al. 2012).
The other technique that is improving biologists' ability to distinguish between these two 
sources of adaptation and provide information about their relative frequency is LNS. Depending 
on their choice of experimental population they can study either hard sweeps (in asexual 
population) or soft sweeps (in sexual populations) in isolation (Burke 2012). There are also some
model systems that allow for comparative analyses of both types of sweeps, and these support, 
among other things, a much larger role for adaptation from standing variation than from de novo 
variation (Burke 2014).
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This selective sweep example is of dual relevance to the plasticity-first hypothesis. First, 
it is a case where formal modeling and experimental evolution are doing precisely the kind of 
work that is of paramount importance for plasticity-first  research. It shows that the 
methodological strategy I am defending can be successful. Second, the idea that selective sweeps
or other genomic patterns may be diagnostic of plasticity-first evolution is barely addressed in 
the literature (Gibson and Dworkin 2004). As a result, no one knows if there is a difference 
between gene-first and phenotype-first adaptation that parallels the one between standing 
variation and de novo mutation. But this question should absolutely be explored. If there is a 
signature of phenotype-first evolution that is analogous to that of standing genetic variation, 
discovering it would transform the debate about the evolutionary significance of plasticity. Even 
if genomic data alone is not sufficient to pick out phenotype-first adaptations, it may be able to 
do so in combination with other kinds of data, such as information about a fixed allele's selective
environment.
 
6. Conclusion. The existing methodological strategy in plasticity-first research involves 
combining comparative studies of different populations that demonstrate different pieces of the 
plasticity-first hypothesis. Together, these studies are supposed to approximate the ideal data set 
much like a mosaic might approximate a photograph. I have argued that this strategy has not 
proven effective for generating discriminatory evidence. Worse, it is insufficient as a stand-alone
strategy for confirming or disconfirming the plasticity-first hypothesis in the future. We should 
be concerned about this state of affairs because the plasticity-first hypothesis stands at the center 
of one of the great questions facing evolutionary biology today: the extent to which the modern 
synthesis needs to be revised or expanded to accommodate developmental and environmental 
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influences on evolution.
I have argued that in addition to piecing together a mosaic of studies that address the 
diverse components of plasticity-first evolution, researchers should go in for diversity of further 
kind—methodological diversity that makes greater use of the full set of tools available to 
evolutionary biologists. This means directing resources toward formal modeling and 
experimental evolution studies. Once researchers use these tools to learn more about the 
signature of plasticity-first evolution, they may find that the data they have already collected has 
more discriminatory power than they thought, or they may find that they need to look for very 
different data. But the priority has to be getting researchers to a point where they can identify 
discriminatory evidence when they see it.
It is also possible that the plasticity-first hypothesis will not turn out to have a distinct 
signature. There is no guarantee we can find evidence that bears on every empirical question that
interests us, though the historical sciences continue to surprise the greater scientific community 
with their ingenuity (Currie 2015; Turner 2016). Regardless of whether there is a signature to be 
found, however, experimental evolution and formal models are where skeptics and advocates of 
plasticity-first evolution alike should continue their dispute about the quality of the evidence for 
the hypothesis. These are the research areas that will allow us to judge the depth of the 
underdetermination problem facing the plasticity-first hypothesis and whether distinguishing 
between plasticity-first and gene-first mechanisms of evolution is a matter of preference or 
genuine scientific interest. 
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